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IT’S BLONDER-TONGUE ALL OVER AGAIN 
 
Alex Kozinski* & Daniel Mandell** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty-two years ago, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982 (Act).1 The Act was the first significant change to the federal 
judiciary since the Judges’ Bill of 1925.2 Among other reforms, the Act merged 
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, creating a 
new judicial phoenix in the form of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.3 Congress bestowed upon its new creation exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent cases, regardless of where in the nation each case arose.4 
In a recent speech at the Supreme Court IP Review held at the Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Chief Judge Diane Wood of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit asked whether it is time to roll back the Act by 
taking away the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.5 Judge 
Wood posits an affirmative answer to her question and proposes to amend the 
current system to provide for shared jurisdiction over patent cases between the 
regional courts of appeals and the Federal Circuit.6 In support of her argument, 
Judge Wood raises several noteworthy points, including the blurred lines 
between patent law and the law governing other forms of intellectual property, 
and the fact that the average patent case may be no more complicated than other 
litigation requiring the interpretation of dense statutes and regulations but which 
is nevertheless entrusted to the generalist judges of the regional courts of 
appeals.7 Judge Wood’s argument concerning the value of having non-
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Alex Kozinski, Daniel Mandell. Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 ** Associate at Mishcon de Reya New York LLP. 
 1 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 2 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 554 (2003). 
 3 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was described as a phoenix by the 
court’s first Chief Judge, Howard T. Markey. See Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix 
Court, 10 APLA Q. J. 227, 227 (1982). 
 4 See Federal Courts Improvement Act § 127(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 
(2006)). 
 5 Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s 
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
 6 See id. at 9–10. 
 7 See id. at 6–7. 
 




specialized courts such as the regional courts of appeals contribute to the 
development of the law channels some of the original concerns expressed by 
Members of Congress at the time the Act was passed.8 
Toward the end of her speech, Judge Wood refers to the “‘bad old days’ 
in which a single patent might be valid in the Second Circuit and invalid in the 
Tenth at the same time.”9 But that problem was largely eliminated over forty 
years ago by the Supreme Court’s holding in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. 
v. University of Illinois Foundation.10 After Blonder-Tongue, there could be no 
inconsistency in the validity of a patent across circuits because a patent declared 
invalid in any circuit would automatically be invalid in all circuits.11 While 
Blonder-Tongue therefore avoids the problem Judge Wood references, it creates 
a different problem that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction has, as a 
practical matter, kept in check. Eliminating the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal Circuit will bring back this problem. 
Blonder-Tongue eliminated the mutuality requirement for collateral 
estoppel in patent cases, enabling a defendant to estop a plaintiff from asserting 
infringement if the patent had previously been found invalid.12 The elimination 
of the mutuality requirement means that a single finding of invalidity effectively 
dooms a patent nationwide. As a result, would-be infringers can continue 
challenging a given patent in courts across the country until one of them obtains 
a determination of invalidity in any circuit. At that point, the invention passes 
into the public domain. Continuing challenges mean that patent holders will 
have to endure repeated trials in district courts throughout the country. It will be 
a long time, if ever, before a patent holder will feel secure that the patent is 
enforceable. The Federal Circuit’s role as exclusive appellate authority over 
patent cases means that there is only a single body of appellate case law 
applicable to any patent, and this goes a long way in mitigating the Blonder-
Tongue problem. 
This brief response to Judge Wood raises the Blonder-Tongue problem so 
that it will not be forgotten in discussing her thoughtful proposal. 
  
 8 Compare id. at 7 with 127 CONG. REC. S14,722 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement 
of Sen. Alan K. Simpson) (“Eliminating forum shopping by conferring an exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction on one circuit court will have the unfortunate side effect of doing 
away with a rich diversity of opinion . . . .”). 
 9 Wood, supra note 5, at 9. 
 10 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971). 
 11 See id. at 338, 349–350. 
 12 Id. at 350. 
 





I. THE HISTORY OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN PATENT CASES AND THE 
IMPACT OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION 
Historically, collateral estoppel could not be asserted by a party who did 
not participate in the prior action.13 This mutuality requirement was specifically 
applied to patent cases in the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in Triplett v. 
Lowell.14 Justice Stone, writing for the Court, explained: 
Neither reason nor authority supports the contention that an adjudication 
adverse to any or all the claims of a patent precludes another suit upon the 
same claims against a different defendant. While the earlier decision may 
by comity be given great weight in a later litigation and thus persuade the 
court to render a like decree, it is not res adjudicata and may not be 
pleaded as a defense.15 
Under Triplett, an accused infringer could not assert the invalidity of a 
patent unless he had been a party in the earlier case. As a result, patent holders 
could repeatedly bring infringement lawsuits, even though the patent had 
already been found invalid, forcing defendants and the courts to expend 
resources re-litigating the patent’s validity. Multiple litigations could, moreover, 
result in divergent outcomes concerning the same patent’s validity.16 This 
situation undermined the purpose of the patent—to provide a limited monopoly 
and its financial windfalls as a reward for innovation—and hampered the growth 
of business.17 
These unintended consequences became apparent approximately thirty-
five years after Triplett, leading to Blonder-Tongue. Blonder-Tongue began 
when the University of Illinois Foundation (Foundation) brought an action in the 
Southern District of Iowa alleging infringement of one of the Foundation’s 
patents.18 The District Court held that the patent was invalid on obviousness 
grounds, and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
  
 13 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) (“It is a 
principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual.”). 
 14 297 U.S. 638 (1936). 
 15 Id. at 642. 
 16 See George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has It 
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
671, 680–83 (2011) (discussing three cases with different defendants and in different 
circuits, but identical facts pertaining to the same patent; the cases “dragged on for eight 
years and occupied the attention of at least twenty-five judges” and produced different 
results). 
 17 See, e.g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Addendum to Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong. 67–68, 69 (1979) (statement of Harry F. Manbeck, General Patent Counsel, 
General Electric). 
 18 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 314 (1971). 
 




Eighth Circuit subsequently affirmed.19 At approximately the same time, the 
Foundation brought a second case in the Northern District of Illinois alleging 
infringement of the same patent by a different defendant. In that case, the 
Foundation prevailed and its patent was found to be valid and infringed.20 On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, creating a direct circuit split regarding the 
validity of the Foundation’s patent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address the circuit split, but subsequently requested further briefing as to the 
continuing viability of Triplett’s mutuality requirement.21 
After discussing how the law of estoppel had been shifting away from the 
mutuality requirement in courts throughout the country, the Supreme Court 
concluded that: 
[p]ermitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of 
unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table 
or “a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower 
courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.”22  
The Court thought that this was especially true in patent litigation, which “is a 
very costly process,”23 and therefore held that “Triplett should be overruled to 
the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of infringement 
of a patent that has once been declared invalid.”24 
The Supreme Court’s repudiation of the mutuality requirement drastically 
changed the effect of a finding of patent invalidity. Whereas under Triplett a 
finding of invalidity had limited impact on the patent-in-suit,25 under Blonder-
Tongue a single finding of invalidity effectively killed a patent nationwide 
because subsequent defendants could use offensive collateral estoppel to counter 
infringement claims.26 For example, in Blonder-Tongue, once the Southern 
District of Iowa held the Foundation’s patent to be invalid, the defendant in the 
Northern District of Illinois—and every defendant thereafter—would have been 
  
 19 Id. at 315. 
 20 Id. at 315–16 (noting that Judge Hoffman, the judge in the Northern District of 
Illinois case, discussed the Southern District of Iowa decision in his opinion, but 
nevertheless found the Foundation’s patent to be valid). 
 21 Id. at 317. 
 22 Id. at 329. 
 23 Id. at 334. 
 24 Id. at 350. 
 25 See id. at 338 (noting that “[u]nder Triplett, only the comity restraints flowing from 
an adverse prior judgment operate to limit the patentee’s right to sue different defendants 
on the same patent”). 
 26 See Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the 
Patent-Challenge-Bloc’s Antitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶23 (2011) 
(observing that after Blonder-Tongue, “an alleged infringer who wins a patent invalidity 
judgment earns a benefit not only for itself, but for everyone . . . .”). 
 





able to estop the Foundation from asserting patent validity and bringing claims 
of infringement on its patent. As the Fifth Circuit put it: 
Blonder-Tongue did not throw merely a jab at the multiplicity of patent 
litigation; rather, it intended a knockout blow through the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel so that any time a patent was found invalid in a fair 
fight with a knowledgeable referee, the courts could count ten and the 
patent holder could no longer maintain that he was champion.27 
Blonder-Tongue gave would-be infringers an incentive to bring a string of 
declaratory judgment actions in courts throughout the country. Would-be 
infringers had the opportunity to choose the forums in which to bring their 
actions, enabling them to choose courts that historically have been hostile to 
patents. And, indeed, courts developed reputations as patent-friendly or as patent 
graveyards.28 
As soon as a single finding of invalidity was made, the patent became 
unenforceable nationwide, even after half a dozen prior victories. Under this 
regime, patent-holders were forced to repeatedly litigate throughout the country 
under a sword of Damocles. Such litigations would be time-consuming and 
expensive, severely depleting the financial rewards of owning the patent. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest Congress was concerned with 
the elimination of the mutuality requirement following Blonder-Tongue,29 it 
certainly was not the primary motivation behind the creation of the Federal 
Circuit. Rather, Congress was far more concerned with the lack of uniformity in 
  
 27 Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 28 Alex Kozinski, A Market-Oriented Revision of the Patent System, 21 UCLA L. 
REV. 1042, 1061–63 (1974). 
 29 See Sen. Roman L. Hruska, Address at the First Judicial Conference of the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (Apr. 30, 1974), in 65 F.R.D. 171, 209 
(1974) (“This development [the limitation of the mutuality requirement in patent 
infringement actions], I understand, has resulted in forum shopping, and in the words of 
Judge Friendly, ‘mad and undignified races . . . between a patentee who wishes to sue for 
infringement in one circuit believed to be benign toward patents, and a user who wants to 
obtain a declaration of invalidity or non-infringement in one believed to be hostile to 
them.’”). 
 




patent law and the forum shopping that was seen as rampant.30 Nonetheless, the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 
did create a practical back-stop against the Blonder-Tongue problem. Because 
all patent appeals go up to the Federal Circuit, there is no possibility of having 
conflicting doctrines apply to the same patent.31 And, of course, district courts 
all over the country defer readily to the Federal Circuit’s supremacy and 
expertise in patent matters. If regional courts of appeals could develop separate 
patent doctrines, would-be infringers could select patent-hostile circuits to bring 
a multiplicity of patent challenges. This would most likely diminish the value of 
patents. 
  
 30 See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (“Patent litigation long has been identified 
as a problem area, characterized by undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency 
in adjudications.”); id. at 23 (“[T]he central purpose [of the new Federal Circuit] is to 
reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in 
the administration of patent law.”); S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (“The creation of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this [patent] 
area of the law.”); 127 CONG. REC. 27,791 (1981) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“A 
second specific goal of the legislation is to provide increased uniformity in the patent 
law. . . . The new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide 
uniformity in patent law, will make litigation results more predictable and will eliminate 
the expensive and time-consuming forum shopping that characterizes litigation in the 
field.”); id. at 29,861 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (“The creation of this appellate 
structure will eventually lead to uniformity in this very important and specialized field of 
law.”); id. (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“The court of appeals for the Federal circuit . . . 
will go a long way to diminishing forum shopping and reducing both the excessive cost 
and inconsistency in patent litigation.”); id. at 29,887 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“We 
are aiming for a definitive, uniform, and clear interpretation of the national law of 
patents.”). Not everyone agrees that the problems were as significant as some made them 
out to be. See, e.g., Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Essay: Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 228–29 (2006). 
 31 See, e.g., Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co., No. 03 Civ. 4419 (PAC), 2007 WL 
2089303, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2007) (analyzing the appropriate amount of 
deference to give to Federal Circuit decisions and concluding that district courts “should 
substitute their own judgment for that previously expressed by the Federal Circuit with 
the greatest trepidation”); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 05 C 5373, 2006 WL 
3718025, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2006) (in considering a request for a temporary 
restraining order, deferring to the prior findings of the Federal Circuit; “this Court will 
not reach a result inconsistent with that holding [of the Federal Circuit] absent a 
substantial showing that on a more complete record, the Federal Circuit would have 
reached a different result”). Deference to Federal Circuit decisions also promotes the 
congressional intent behind the Federal Circuit. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a 
Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through 
Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 578 (2004). 
 





II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
If exclusive jurisdiction were removed from the Federal Circuit, 
something should be done to create a new check against the Blonder-Tongue 
problem. The simplest way to avoid this problem is to reverse Blonder-Tongue 
and reinstate the mutuality requirement. There are two ways this could be done: 
either the Supreme Court could overrule Blonder-Tongue or Congress could 
legislatively reverse Blonder-Tongue’s holding. But completely eliminating 
Blonder-Tongue will return the system to how it was under Triplett, and will 
resurrect the problems the Supreme Court sought to eliminate in 1971. 
Moreover, permitting a patent holder to continue asserting a patent that has been 
found invalid might raise due process issues because the patent holder would be 
able to continue asserting a property right—and impose the cost and delay of 
litigation—once a court of competent jurisdiction has held that the patent holder 
does not have a property right at all. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blonder-Tongue created a situation 
where would-be patent infringers were encouraged to file repeated actions until 
they obtained a finding of patent invalidity. Patent holders feared the possibility 
of defending against these repeated actions under a sword of Damocles, as a 
single negative outcome could knock out the patent. The Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction has acted as a check against this problem by creating a 
single arbiter of patent validity. In considering Judge Wood’s proposal for 
removing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, it is important to 
remember the Blonder-Tongue problem and account for it in whatever proposals 
come out of the conversation. 
